Our economists have been involved in well over 70 Phase II merger investigations under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), submitting expert reports or making presentations on behalf of clients at Oral Hearings in most of those cases. We have also represented clients on merger investigations before numerous domestic merger control authorities including the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission in the UK, the NMa in the Netherlands, the Bundeskartellamt in Germany, as well as the national authorities in Australia, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and South Africa, among others.

RBB has extensive knowledge of the economic issues raised by the various aspects of European and domestic merger procedures.

	Market definition
	Our ability to marshal diverse sources of evidence and sophisticated quantitative techniques, along with our deep understanding of the economic principles of substitution underpinning market definition, has allowed us to develop robust analyses in a wide range of market environments.
	Assessment of market power
	We understand that the over-reliance on simplistic market share measures can often mislead, and are skilled at assembling the detailed evidence required to appraise the actual competitive constraints offered by competitors, potential entrants and customers.
	Differentiated products and unilateral effects analysis
	Where the products in a market are differentiated from each other, an evaluation of the ‘closeness’ of the merging parties’ products and those of their rivals is generally required. We are equipped with the quantitative techniques to do this, enabling us to rule out adverse effects in many cases, and to address specific sources of concern or shape appropriate remedies in others.
	Bidding markets
	We are used to gathering and analysing detailed information on bidding contests, to test whether the independent presence of both merging parties has affected outcomes in the past. Where it can be shown that the parties do not compete effectively for the same business, or where a number of equally effective competitors for that business exist, then a merger should not be seen as raising concerns.
	Co-ordinated effects analysis
	Competition authority concerns that mergers may facilitate tacit coordination between firms can be amongst the most difficult to assess and rebut. Our ability to combine an understanding of the economic theories which lie behind those concerns with practical expertise in the working of oligopolistic industries allows us to evaluate whether this type of concern is valid in the circumstances of a particular merger.
	Exclusionary effects and other non-horizontal theories of harm
	Our economists᾿ practical ability to rigorously test rival theories against the facts of an individual case has proved decisive where often highly theoretical concerns about the potential leveraging of market power from one market to another have been raised by the authorities. Similarly we have analysed concerns relating to vertical foreclosure, portfolio power, and other so-called conglomerate effects.